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User attention is the new frontier
in content regulation – Improving
the accountability of soft content




Social media platforms have an inglorious history of algorithmically promoting
and amplifying misinformation, hate, and other repulsive behavior. These are
serious challenges to the health of our information eco-systems, and they
continue to persist, despite platforms’ pledges to tackle the problem. However,
we should not overlook another looming challenge in this space: algorithmic
content curation has powerful gatekeeping functions, and platforms are
increasingly putting them to use.
Indeed, there has been a marked paradigm shift over recent years in how social
media platforms police online content. In addition to traditional “hard” moderation
tools such as content removals or account suspensions, platform companies
are increasingly relying on recommender systems, i.e. algorithms that guide
users’ attention towards selected content, and other design choices in order to
systematically reduce the visibility and spread of unwanted content.
 Systematic demotion of content and freedom of expression
concerns
Facebook’s policy change on “borderline content” offers an instructive example. In
2018, Mark Zuckerberg announced that his company would start to target borderline
content, i.e. content that toes the line of what is acceptable, but that falls just
short of violating the Community Standards. According to Zuckerberg, Facebook
would achieve this by “penalizing borderline content so it gets less distribution and
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engagement.” Since then, Facebook announced that it would also begin to demote
anti-vaccination and “low-quality content.”
Other platforms systemically reduce user exposure to certain content as well. TikTok
reportedly curbed the reach of videos showing people with disabilities; Twitter
penalizes certain Tweets by turning off engagements such as likes, replies, and
retweets.
The underlying logic of this approach is straightforward: let people continue to post
things that are annoying, unsavory, or offensive, while shielding most users from
having to actually encounter such material. Targeting user exposure instead of
content allows platform companies to have the cake and eat it, too; they are able to
deflect the private censorship criticism associated with hard content restriction and
still massively reduce the prevalence of unwanted content.
Despite its general classification as a “soft” content restriction mode, reducing
the visibility of content can easily turn into a massive freedom of expression
problem. Platforms purport to be showing users what they do (not) want to see
—less borderline content, for instance. That means that platforms prioritize their
user communities’ (presumed) preferences over the actual free speech interests of
affected content providers and recipients, who are, respectively, interested in sharing
and receiving that content.
Moreover, what we presumably want to see may be very different from what we
ought to be exposed to as informed citizens in democratic societies. This raises hard
questions as to how public values and individual user choices can be implemented
into platforms’ content curation, while reconciling them with the freedom of platform
companies to customize their services. Importantly, this is where the content
moderation debate overlaps with the broader issue of content curation.
Demotion and other changes to the visibility of content also threatens to undo much
of the progress that has only recently been made in prompting platform companies to
become more accountable  regarding hard content moderation. Practices targeting
user exposure mainly affect content that falls outside of platforms’ policies for
prohibited material; it is therefore unclear what rules apply to such measures (try
your hand at defining “borderline content”).
Given the worrisome implications for freedom of expression, platforms need to
be held accountable for what they hide from our attention. One avenue—and
the approach commonly favored by European policymakers and civil society
organizations—is to increase the transparency of platforms’ recommender systems.
Yet, transparency as an accountability mechanism has limitations. Entering into
the complex debate on meaningful transparency is beyond the scope of this post.
Instead, it focusses on other safeguards that appear to be more low-hanging fruit,
namely notifications and appeal mechanisms.
Most large platforms have already implemented complaints procedures, which
allow users to appeal certain takedown decisions and/or account-level sanctions.
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In contrast, users affected by demotion are left out in the cold. Platforms give no
pointers to tell if a piece of content was made less visible in search results or feeds.
This uncertainty is jarring; as Robin Mansell pointed out, “[c]itizens cannot choose
to view what they are not aware of or to protest about the absence of content which
they cannot discover.”
The current European regulatory framework fails to adequately address this problem.
If anything, the EU’s Code of Practice on Disinformation incentivizes its signatories,
among them Facebook, Google, and Twitter, to “[d]ilute the visibility of disinformation
by improving the findability of trustworthy content,” without mentioning even minimal
safeguards. The Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), which regulates
video-sharing platforms, does require Member States to ensure that out-of-court
redress mechanisms are available for users subjected to state-sanctioned content
moderation (Art. 28b(7) AVMSD); however, measures reducing the spread of content
appear to fall outside the scope of the AVMSD.
 Proposal for an accountability mechanism
In light of the freedom of expression implications, platforms should notify users of
changes to the visibility of content in the same way as when content is taken down.
These notifications should state the reason for and the specifics of the measure
taken. This safeguard would give affected users content-specific knowledge of how
soft moderation affects the reach of certain categories of content.
In a next step, platforms should ideally allow users to appeal decisions impacting the
reach of their content. This approach is not entirely unproblematic, since platform
companies are in principle free to prioritize certain content over other material
(although it should be noted that German courts are increasingly applying the
doctrine of horizontal fundamental rights obligations in the context of takedown
decisions). Appeal mechanisms would therefore have to be sufficiently narrow in
scope to exempt general content curation.
Statutory regulation to this end may to be too heavy-handed, given the moving target
and the fact that different platforms use different tools. A more flexible approach
at the EU level, perhaps in the form of a Code of Conduct, seems more promising.
Such a co-regulatory approach could also ensure a degree of public oversight, for
instance by including binding reporting obligations.
In sum, European policymakers, researchers, civil society activists, and platform
companies have to move fast to come to an understanding on how to best achieve
accountability in a space that appears to be the new frontier in content regulation.
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